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COMMENTS
The Real Estate Investment Trust: State Tax, Tort, and
Contract Liabilities of the Trust, Trustee,
and Shareholder
In 1960, after lying dormant for almost twenty-five years,1 the
business trust2 suddenly became a subject of great interest as a result of the addition of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act3 to the
Internal Revenue Code. Under the Act, a Real Estate Investment
Trust (REIT), which is basically a business trust that meets certain
specified qualifications,4 does not have to pay any federal tax on the
portion of its capital gains and ordinary income that it distributes
to its shareholders during or with respect to the taxable year.'1
Since the passage of the Act, as could be expected, there have
been a large number of REITs formed, 6 and a great number of
articles written about them. 7 However, almost all of these articles
I. This period of dormancy began with the landmark case of Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), in which the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts trusts
were taxable as corporations, changing the earlier rule expressed in Crocker v. Malley,
249 U.S. 223 (1919).
2. Also known as a common-law trust or Massachusetts trust, defined by the Supreme
Court as
[a form] of business organization, common in that State [Massachusetts], consisting
essentially of an arrangement whereby property is conveyed to trustees, in accordance with the terms of an instrument of trust, to be held and managed for the
benefit of such persons as may from time to time be the holders of transferable
certificates issued by the trustees showing the shares into which the beneficial in•
terest property is divided.
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146-47 (1924).
3. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 856-58, effective for taxable years beginning after Dec.
31, 1960.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856(a), 856(c), 857(a). See text accompanying notes 10-21
infra.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b).
6. There are presently 174 real estate investment trusts registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the
Michigan Law Review, Nov. 28, 1972.
7. E.g., Dockser, Real Estate Investment Trusts: An Old Business Form Revitalized,
17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 115 (1962); Jones, Business Trusts in Florida-Liability of Shareholders, I4 FLA. L. REv. 1 (1961); Kahn, Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 48
VA. L. REv. 1011 (1962); Kelley, Real Estate Investment Trusts After Seven Years, 23
Bus. LAw. 1001 (1968); Kilpatrick, The Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts and
Their Shareholders, 39 TAXES 1042 (1961); Roberts, The Real Estate Investment TrustNew Tax-Saving opportunity for Investors, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INST. 27; Sobieski,
State Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts-The Midwest Position,
48 VA. L. REv. 1069 (1962); Weissman, The Common Law of Business Trusts, 38 CHI.KENT L. REv. 11 (1961); Weissman, A New Look at Business Trusts, 49 !LL. B.J. 744
(1961); Comment, The Real Estate Investment Trust: Legal and Economic Aspects, 24
U. MIAMI L. REV. 155 (1969); Note, The Real Estate Investment Trust-Arkansas Considerations, 24 .ARK. L. REv. 453 (1971); Note, The Real Estate Investment Trust-Past,
Present, and Future, 23 U. Pl1T. L. REv. 779 (1962); Note, Liability of Shareholders in
a Business Trust-The Control Test, 48 VA. L. REv. 1105 (1962), See also Selected Ma-
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have dealt with the federal tax aspects of REITs; only a few have
investigated problems encountered in dealing with state statutes
and case law on business trusts. 8 The current posture of state law
in this area is confused despite the passage of twelve years since the
adoption of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act. Indeed, it has
been noted that many investors are reluctant to purchase REIT
shares because they believe that investment in a REIT entails the
assumption of liabilities under state law-particularly for debts and
torts of the REIT-to a greater extent than investment in a corporation. 9
This Comment will attempt to alert potential investors in and
trustees of REITs to the full extent of the liabilities that they could
suffer for contract debts incurred in the name of the trust and torts
committed by trust personnel. Since state tax considerations also
play a significant role in investment decisions, the manner in which
each state taxes the REIT and its shareholders on income derived
from property and business in that state will also be investigated.
Finally, a rational path out of the morass created by current state
law will be articulated in order to prompt renewed discussion in
Congress and in the state legislatures and courts on a cogent policy
for dealing with the liabilities of the REIT, its trustees, and its
shareholders.

l.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

To obtain the special tax treatment afforded by the Real Estate
Investment Trust Act, a business must fulfill a number of qualifications. It must be an unincorporated trust or unincorporated
association,1° be managed by one or more trustees, 11 have its beneficial ownership evidenced by transferable shares,12 be the type of
entity that would ordinarily be taxable as a domestic corporation
but for the REIT provisions of the Code,13 and be owned by at
least one hundred persons. 14 It cannot be a business that would be
a personal holding company if all of its adjusted ordinary gross interials on Real Estate Investment Trusts and Real Estate Syndication, 27 R.EcoRD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 537 (1972).
8. E.g., Jones, supra note 7; Weissman, 38 Cm.-KENT L. R.Ev. 11, supra note 7; Weissman, 49 ILL. B.J. 744, supra note 7; Note, 24 ARK. L. R.Ev. 453, supra note 7; Note, 48
VA, L. R.Ev. 1105, supra note 7.
9. H.R. REP. No. 481, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
IO. INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 856(a).
11. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(l).
12. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(2).
13. lr-.T. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(3).
14. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(5).
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come were personal holding company income,15 and it cannot hold
any property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
its trade or business.16 It must distribute to its shareholders at least
ninety per cent of its taxable ordinary income.17
In addition, a business entity must meet certain requirements
as to sources of income and diversification of assets in each taxable
year in which it seeks to qualify as a REIT. It must derive: 1) at
least ninety per cent of its gross income from dividends, interest,
rents from real property, gain from the sale or other disposition
of stock, securities, and real property (including interests in real
property), and abatements and refunds of real property taxes; 18 2) at
least seventy-five per cent of its gross income from its passive real
estate investments and from abatements and refunds on real property;19 3) less than thirty per cent of its gross income from the sum
of its short-term capital gains on stock or securities and its gains
from the sale of real property held less than four years. 20 At the
close of each quarter of its taxable year, at least seventy-five per cent
of its total assets must be represented by real estate assets, cash, and
government securities, with the remaining twenty-five per cent, if
invested in securities, limited to not more than ten per cent of the
outstanding voting securities of any one issuer. 21
If an entity can meet all these qualifications, it can serve, in
essence, as a conduit, with its distributed income ta.xed only once
-when it gets into the hands of its shareholders.22 As something
of a quid pro quo, shareholders may not treat any distributions of
ordinary income from the REIT as dividends for purposes of the
one hundred dollar dividends-received exclusion23 or the eighty-five
per cent dividends-received deduction applicable to corporate shareholders.24
15. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(6). "Adjusted ordinary gross income" is defined
by section 543(b)(2).
16. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(4).
17. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(l).
18. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(2).
19. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(3).
20. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(4).
21. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5).
22. It is obvious that to someone who prefers investments in entities that distribute
a large proportion of their income this conduit treatment is a great advantage, for the
REIT's income is taxed only once, while at least ninety per cent of such income is distributed. To an investor in a high tax bracket, who would prefer that the entity retain
a large proportion of its income so that the stock would appreciate in value, such an
arrangement is not particularly advantageous. However, since Congress was concerned
with the small investor, see text accompanying notes 25-28 infra, this Comment will
refer to the tax treatment afforded to RElTs as a tax "advantage."
23. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 116(b)(3).
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 243(c)(3).
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By granting tax advantages to REITs, Congress intended to encourage the growth of REITs in order to increase the funds available for equity financing of the large real estate developments and
redevelopments needed in metropolitan areas.25 Moreover, in recognition of the shortage of private capital and mortgage money,
Congress sought to encourage investment in real estate by a broad
spectrum of the public and to stimulate the flow of money for homes,
apartment houses, office buildings, factories, and hotels from sources
other than the traditional government-guaranteed loans and loans
from insurance companies, pension funds, and other financial institutions.26 Finally, it intended to afford the opportunity to small
investors to participate in large scale, expertly managed real estate
ventures, in which only a few wealthy individuals had previously
been capable of investing. 27 A similar opportunity had been afforded
since 1936 to small investors in regulated investment companies,
commonly known as mutual funds, with respect to income from
stocks and bonds.28
In addition to favorable tax treatment, the REIT offers many
other advantages to the small investor who wishes to invest in real
estate. It is said to be a hybrid29 between the two other forms of
organization that have been used for investment in real estate-the
corporation and the partnership30-offering the best of each and
the worst of neither. Like a corporation,31 the REIT offers centralized management and free transferability of shares as well as, in
25. H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1960).
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 3-4.
28. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-55.
This secures for the trust beneficiaries the same type of tax treatment they would
receive if they held the real estate equities and mortgages directly and, therefore,
equates their treatment with that accorded investors in regulated investment companies.
• • . [I]n both cases the methods of investment constitute pooling arrangements
whereby small investors can secure advantages normally available only to those with
larger resources. These advantages include the spreading of the risk of loss by the
greater diversification of investment which can be secured through the pooling
arrangement; the opportunity to secure the benefits of expert investment counsel;
and the means of collectively financing projects which investors could not undertake singly•
. . • [Y]our committee believes it is also desirable to remove taxation to the
extent possible as a factor in determining the relative size of investment in stocks
and securities on one hand and real estate equities and mortgages on the other.
H.R. REP. No. 2020, supra note 25, at 3-4. It should be noted that some commentators
feel that, although the reasons given by Congress for the passage of this tax advantage
may have validity, the real reason for its passage was the effective lobbying of several
business trusts from Massachusetts. Kahn, supra note 7, at 1016; Zarrow, Tax Aspects,
in REAL EsTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS II, at 41, 43 (Practising Law Institute 1970).
29. Oklahoma Fullers Earth Co. v. Evans, 179 Okla. 124, 125, 64 P.2d 899, 901 (1937).
30. See generally Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 30-52 (1945).
31. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 96 (2d ed. 1970).
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most states, limited liability for shareholders.32 All this is offered,
of course, without the double taxation that distributed corporate
income must bear.83 In this respect, the REIT is like a partnership,
for partnership income is taxed only to the partners and not to the
partnership itself.84 However, a partnership has several characteristics not shared by the REIT. First, participation in a partnership
is limited to those selected by the individual partners for their personal qualifications,85 and the death or notice of withdrawal of a
partner signals the dissolution of the partnership; 36 a REIT is open
to investment by the public, and it continues to exist despite the
death or withdrawal of a trustee or shareholder.37 Moreover, in most
states38 the beneficiaries of a REIT are not personally liable for the
debts of the business as are the general partners of a partnership.39
Finally, REITs have the potential to attract more investors than
partnerships engaged in real estate investment, for several reasons.
First, unlike partnerships, REITs can offer freely transferable shares.
Furthermore, REITs generally sell their shares at cheaper prices
than real estate partnerships offer. 4 Finally, REITs are generally
more diversified in their investments than partnerships.41
It is apparent then, that, both in terms of organizational form
and federal tax status, the REIT has much to offer certain investors.42
However, in order to draw any final conclusions on the relative attractiveness of this type of investment, it is necessary to ascertain
the consequences currently imposed by state law on investment in
this type of pusiness.

°

II.

CONTRACT LlABILITIES

REIT Trustees
It is well settled that the officers, directors, and other employees
of corporations are not personally liable on corporate contracts so
A.

32. See text accompanying notes 58-67 &: 73-76 infra.
33. Kelley, supra note 7, at 1004. Indeed, real estate investment and development
corporations, which must pay corporate taxes, have been largely confined to investments
offering high depreciation relative to cash yield in order to avoid double taxation. Id.
at 1002.
34. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 701.
35. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, PARTNERSHIP § 5(c) (1968).
36. Id.§ 73.
37. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 91.
38. See text accompanying notes 58-67 infra.
39. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 55-57.
40. Real estate syndicates, the most common form of real estate partnerships, usually sell shares ranging in price from 1,000 to 10,000 dollars each. Kelley, supra note 7,
at 1004.
41. Partnerships typically only invest in one or two properties and thus expose the
investor to many more risks. Comment, supra note 7, at 168.
42. Those who desire large dividend returns on their invested capital rather than
capital gains income. See note 22 supra.
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long as they are acting in their representative capacities.43 The law
regarding liability of REIT trustees, however, is not so well settled.
Although a few states have statutes stating that the trustee is not
personally liable for such contracts,44 most of the law in this area is
judge-made. Almost universally, courts have held that the trustee
of a business trust is personally liable for contractual obligations
incurred on behalf of the trust.45 This result is explained on the
following ground:
A trustee is not an agent. An agent represents and acts for his
principal, who may be either a natural or artificial person. A trustee
may be defined generally as a person in whom some estate, interest,
or power in or affecting property is vested for the benefit of another.
"When an agent contracts in the name of his principal, the principal
contracts and is bound, but the agent is not. "When a trustee contracts
as such, unless he is bound, no one is bound, for he has no principal.
The trust estate cannot promise; the contract is therefore the personal
undertaking of the trustee.46
However, most of the cases dealing with the liability of the
trustees have involved attempts to limit that liability in the declaration of trust and in contracts between the trust and third parties.
In such cases, the courts have generally stated that the mere addition of the word "trustee" or "as trustee" to the trustee's signature
on a contract is insufficient to effect a limitation of liability.47 It has
been held, however, that a trustee can be relieved of personal liability by a clause in the trust instrument, provided that the state's
43. See, e.g., Alberts v. Schneiderman, 182 S.2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); First
Natl. Bank of Hopkins v. International Mach. Corp., 279 Minn. 188, 156 N.W.2d 86
(1968). See generally H. HENN, supra note 31, at 96.
44. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(3) (Supp. 1972); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2206A (1965)
(business trust instrument may relieve the trustee from liability); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 78C, § 4 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 318.02 (1969); Mrss. CODE ANN. § 5570-05(c)
(Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 174 (1971) (read in conjunction with Hauser v.
Catlett, 197 Okla. 668, 173 P.2d 728 (1946)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-204 (1962) (business
trust instrument may relieve the trustee from liability); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 4714-10 (1969); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6138A (1970) (REIT trustees only); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-12-6 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-350(1) (1966).
45. E.g., Andrews v. Horton, 8 Cal. App. 2d 40, 47 P .2d 496 (1935); Austin v. Parker,
317 Ill. 348, 148 N.E. 19 (1925); Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 557, 245 P. 143
(1926); Philip Carey Co. v. Pingree, 223 Mass. 352, Ill N.E. 857 (1916); J.P. Webster &:
Sons v. Utopia Confectionary, 254 S.W. 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), overruled by TEx.
REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6138A (1970) (for REITs only). For additional cases in these
and other states, see 3 G. BOGERT, TRusrs &: TRUSTEES § 300 (2d ed. 1964); Annot., supra
note 30, at 162 n.42 (1945); contra, H. Kempner v. Welker, 36 Ariz. 128, 283 P. 284
(1929); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. North, 320 Ill. App. 221, 50 N.E.2d 434 (1943);
Hamilton v. Young, ll6 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 (1924).
46. Taylor v. Davis' Admrx., IIO U.S. 330, 334-35 (1884). See also McGovern v. Bennett, 146 Mich. 558, 109 N.W. 1055 (1906).
47. E.g., Philip Carey Co. v. Pingree, 223 Mass. 352, Ill N.E. 857 (1916);· Larsen v.
Sylvester, 282 Mass. 352, 185 N.E. 44 (1933). See generally 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45,
§ 300; H. HENN, supra note 31, at 89; Annot., supra note 30, at 164.
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statutory law makes the clause effective.48 However, most courts
have held that a third party who has not been given notice of such
a clause is not bound thereby and can subject the trustee to personal liability.49 Even in some states that do not by statute make
such trust instrument clauses effective, courts have concluded that
liability can be successfully limited by the insertion of a provision
in contracts with third parties that the trustees shall not be personally liable and that the creditors agree to look solely to the trust
for the satisfaction of their obligations.50
The liability of the trustees is a personal obligation, and execution on judgments secured by trust creditors may be levied upon
personal assets of the trustee. In the absence of statute, only when
such assets are not available is there a possibility that relief will be
given in equity against the trust estate.51 However, if the trustees
acted within their authority in undertaking the obligation and have
paid it from their personal assets, states that have considered the
matter have concluded that the trustees have a right to indemnity,
first from the trust income, and if that is insufficient, then from the
trust corpus.52 However, if the obligation was incurred without authority, or arose from negligent or willful conduct for which the
48. Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 (1924); Dunning v. Gibbs, 213
Ky. 81, 280 S.W. 483 (1926); Boyle v. Rider, 136 Md. 286, 110 A. 524 (1920); Shoe &:
Leather Natl. Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148 (1877); William Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman,
190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650 (1934); George v. Hall, 262 S.W. 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
49. E.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Goldberg, 143 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1944); Gold•
water v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 P.2d 624 (1930); Linn v. Houston, 123 Kan. 409, 255
P. 1105 (1927); Downey Co. v. 282 Beacon St. Trust, 292 Mass. 175, 197 N.E. 643 (1935);
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d
71 (1943); Continental Supply Co. v. Adams, 272 S.W. 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), overruled by TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6138A (1970) (for REITs only). For additional
cases in these and other states, see Annot., supra note 30, at 173 n.85. See also Hilde•
brand, Liability of Trustees, Property, and Shareholders of a Massachusetts Trust, 2
TEXAS L. REv. 139, 165 (1924).
50. E.g., Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 P. 624 (1930); Schumann-Heinle v.
Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927); Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045
(1924); Rand v. Farquhar, 226 Mass. 91, 115 N.E. 286 (1917); William Lindeke Land
Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650 (1934); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives &:
Granting Annuities v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d 71 (1943); Shelton v. Montoya Oil &:
Gas Co., 292 s.w. 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1804(2)
(1964). For additional cases from these and other states, see Annot., supra note 30, at
165-66 nn.59-61. Cf. Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 537, 245 P. 143 (1927).
51. 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, §§ 300, 302. Of course, this may not be true where
there is a clause in a third-party contract excluding personal and including estate liability. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra. Moreover, a number of states have
gotten around this common-law rule by statutes permitting suit against the trust in
its own name. MINN, STAT. ANN.§ 318.02 (1969); N.Y. GEN. AssNs. LAw §§ 13 (McKinney
Supp. 1972), 15 (McKinney 1942); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 182 (1960); S.C. CoDE
ANN. § 52-204 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 226.14(11) (Supp. 1972). See generally 3 G. BOGERT, supra, § 302 n.59.
52. Downey Co. v. 282 Beacon St. Trust, 292 Mass. 175, 197 N.E. 643 (1935) (dictum);
Connally v. Lions, 82 Tex. 664, 18 S.E. 799 (1891). See generally H. HENN, supra note
31, at 89-90; Hildebrand, supra note 49, at 155; Annot., supra note 30, at 142.
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trustee is personally responsible, there is no right to reimbursement.li3
If the trust estate is insufficient to make the trustee whole when
he has discharged a liability properly incurred in the administration of the trust, the issue arises whether he may obtain reimbursement from the beneficiaries.li4 The only case that can be found on
point, Darling v. Buddy,li 5 denied the trustee of a business trust the
right to recover from the beneficiaries an amount he had paid toward
a debt that he had contracted for the trust. The court analyzed the
case in terms of certain general legal principles applicable to business trusts: that third parties may not hold persons liable as partners in an enterprise in the absence of a consensual partnership
arrangementli 6 and that the trustee is a principal rather than the
agent of the beneficiaries. 57 Therefore, since third parties could not
hold the beneficiaries personally liable for the debts the trustee had
contracted, the court concluded that the trustee could not obtain
indemnification from the beneficiaries for payment of such debts.
B.

REIT Shareholders

Corporate shareholders generally have no liability for the corporation's contracts.58 A few states have statutes that insulate busi53. Rubens v. Costello, 75 Ariz. 5, 251 P.2d 306 (1952); Sykes v. Parker, 250 Ill. App.
299 (1928); Winslow v. Young, 94 Me. 145, 47 A. 149 (1900); Dunham v. Blood, 207 Mass.
512, 93 N.E. 804 (1911); McFadden v. Leeka, 48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N.E. 874 (1891). See
generally Annot., supra note 30, at 142.
54. Some commentators have stated that the trustee may or should be able to obtain
reimbursement. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 90; Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts, 28 HARV. L. REv. 725, 728 (1915); Symmonds, Business Trusts,
15 MARQ. L. REv. 211, 215-16 (1931). However, their statements are based on an old
English case, Hardoon v. Belilios, [1901] A.C. 118, which really is not on point. The
case held that a trustee who had been found personally liable on a debt of the trust
could get reimbursement directly from the trust beneficiary since the trust assets were
not enough to cover the payment. However, the trust involved there was not a business
trust, but a standard trust; moreover, there was only one beneficiary who owned the
entire beneficial interest in the property held in trust. The court emphasized that the
latter fact was extremely important in its decision, [1901] A.C. at 124, and implied that
had there been several beneficiaries, as there are in the case of a REIT, it would not
have decided the case the same way. Finally, the beneficiary in Hardoon demanded from
the trustee all the income from the trust property and paid all calls upon the price of
the property, [1901] A.C. at 126-27. Thus, although legal title to the trust property
was not in the beneficiary's name, he assumed all the benefits and burdens of ownership.
55. 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W.2d 163 (1927).
56. 318 Mo. at 795, 1 S.W.2d at 167.
57. 318 Mo. at 799, 1 S.W.2d at 170,
58. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 96. Under modern corporation laws, shareholders do
have liability where they exercise the role of directors; in addition, in some states if
they treat corporate assets as their own, undercapitalize the entity, or lead creditors to
believe they will be personally responsible for corporate debts, they will be held liable
for such debts. See id. at 250-59.
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ness trust shareholders from personal liability for the trust's contract
debts; 59 no state has a statute that provides otherwise.
However, there seems to be a division in the state case authority
dealing with this problem. The majority view is that shareholders
of a business trust will not incur personal liability for the trust's debts
so long as there is a separation of management from beneficial ownership in the trust. 60 However, the states that adhere to the majority
view generally impose personal liability on the beneficiaries when
they exercise sufficient control over trust affairs to make the trustees
their agents. 61 What constitutes "control" in any given case is a matter of £act. For example, where the only power given to the trust
beneficiaries is the power to elect trustees annually, the beneficiaries
are usually not held to control trust affairs. 62 On the other hand,
control has been found where the beneficiaries are given some combination of the powers to remove the trustees, to fill the vacancies,
to amend the declaration of trust, and to prevent the sale of real
estate.63
A minority of courts have held that business trust shareholders
are vulnerable to unlimited liability for trust debts regardless of
59. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(4) (Supp. 1971); Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-509 (Supp.
1972); CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 23001 (West Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 609.07 (Supp.
1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-4-1-2 (1972) (trust instrument may provide for limited liability of shareholders); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-2035 (1964); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:49l(B)
(Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 78C; § 4 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § lll8.02 (1969);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 6570-07 (Supp. 1972); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2505 (Supp. Vol. 2,
1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 174 (1971) (read in conjunction with Hauser v. Catlett,
197 Okla. 668, 173 P.2d 728 (1946)); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 52-204 (1962) (declaration of trust
which limits personal liability of beneficiary is binding); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 4714-10 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1804(4) (1964); TIDC. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6138A
(1970) (REIT shareholders only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-12-5 (1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6.1-350 (1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 423.90.020 (1959).
60. Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S.W. 602 (1923); Goldwater v. Oltman,
210 Cal. 408, 292 P. 624 (1930); Levy v. Nellis, 284 Ill. App. 228, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936);
Greco v. Hubbard, 252 Mass. 37, 147 N.E. 272 (1925); Rossman v. Marsh, 287 Mich. 720,
286 N.W. 83 (1939); Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W.2d 163 (1927). For additional
cases from these and other states, see Annot., supra note 30, at 107 n.15.
61. Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S.W. 602 (1923); Goldwater v. Oltman,
210 Cal. 408, 292 P. 624 (1930); Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250
(1927); Williams v. Inhabitants of Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N.E. 355 (1913); Darling , ••
Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W.2d 163 (1927); Brown v. Bedell, 263 N.Y. 177, 188 N.E. 641
(1934). For additional cases from these and other states, see Annot., supra note 30, at
112 n.28.
62. Gutelius v. Stanbon, 39 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1930); Levy v. Nellis, 284 Ill. App.
228, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936); Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 190 P. 601 (1920);
Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 P. 1045 (1924); Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784,
1 S.W.2d 163 (1928).
63. Howe v. Chmielinski, 237 Mass. 532, 130 N.E. 56 (1921); Goubeaux v. Krickenberger, 126 Ohio St. 302, 185 N.E. 201 (1933); But see Commissioner v. City of Spring•
field, 321 Mass. 31, 71 N.E.2d 593 (1947). That it is extremely hard to draw lines or effect
general rules in this area is amply demonstrated by the discussion of cases in Annot.,
supra note 30, at 114-19.
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control.64 In most of these states, this result follows from the fact
that the business trust is not recognized as an entity. 65
Finally, in a fairly substantial number of states there simply is
no statutory or case law concerning this problem. 66 Whether beneficiaries of a business trust are liable for the debts of the trust in
those states is apparently still a matter of conjecture.67

III. TORT LIABILITIES
The trustees of a business trust, like corporate officers and directors, 68 are personally liable for their own torts, including those com64. Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 P. 35 (1925), overruled by Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN.
10-509 (Supp. 1972) (for REIT shareholders); McClaren v. Dawes Elec. Sign & Mfg. Co.,
86 Ind. App. 196, 156 N.E. 584 (1927), modified by IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-5-1-2 (1972) (trust
instrument may provide for limited liability of shareholders); Linn v. Houston, 123
Kan. 409, 255 P. 1105 (1927), overruled by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2035 (1964) (for REIT
shareholders); Ing v. Liberty Natl. Bank, 216 Ky. 467, 287 S.W. 960 (1926); American
Natl. Bank v. Reclamation Oil Producing Assn., 156 La. 652, IOI S. 10 (1924), overruled
by LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:49l(B) (Supp. 1972) (for REIT shareholders); Thompson
v. Schmitt, 15 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925), overruled by TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6138A (1970) (for REIT shareholders).
One author suggests that at least two policy arguments can be mustered in favor
of holding the shareholders personally liable: I) business trust shareholders make their
investments with profits in mind, so it is only fair that they should be responsible for
the venture's debts; 2) such a policy solves the problem of deciding in each and every
case whether the amount of control exercised is enough to warrant liability. Jones,
supra note 7, at 23-24.
65. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 88. In Arizona, Kansas, and Louisiana, a trust is
regarded as a corporation and failure to comply with corporation laws results in the
imposition of individual liability upon the shareholders. In Kentucky and Indiana a
business trust is held to be a partnership for purposes of imposing personal liability.
In Texas a business trust is treated as a joint stock company, and shareholders bear
personal liability. See authorities cited in note 64 supra.
The legal status of the business trust in Washington is currently unclear. Recent
legislation has been passed which offers recognition to the business trust and which
recognizes the trust's ability to immunize its shareholders from personal liability to
third persons. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 23.90.010-.900 (1961). However, since the
business trust was previously regarded as invalid in Washington under an interpretation
of the state constitution, State ex rel. Range v. Hinkle, 126 Wash. 581, 219 P. 41 (1923),
the constitutionality of the enabling statute would appear to be open to serious question. 3 z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 43.08[3] (1972).
Kentucky and Washington may be the only states where shareholders of a REIT
may still be personally liable for the contracts of the REIT, for Arizona, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, and Texas all have statutes now that specifically exempt shareholders
of a REIT, although not necessarily of any business trust, from personal liability. See
authorities cited in note 59 supra.
66. Alaska; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Iowa; Maine;
Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Mexico; North Carolina; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Vermont; West Virginia; Wisconsin; Wyoming.
67. However, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, \Visconsin, and Wyoming are members of the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association,
whose Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Investment Trusts attempts through
the regulation of the sale of REIT shares to make limited liability of REIT shareholders the norm. See notes 123-26 infra and accompanying text.
68. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 456-57.
§
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mitted in furtherance of the trust's business.69 In addition, they are
personally liable for torts committed in the course of trust business
by the agents and employees of the trust. 70 It has been held that
such employees are the servants or agents of the trustees and not of
the beneficiaries so that liability cannot be shifted to the shareholders. 71 However, one case has held that, at least where the deed
of trust provides that the trustees shall not be liable for the torts
of agents or employees of the trust, any judgment entered against
the trustees on account of such torts shall be paid out of the trust
estate.72
The tort liabilities of the shareholders of a business trust follow
much the same pattern as their contract liabilities. Like corporate
shareholders, who normally incur no liability for the torts of corporate personnel,78 business trust shareholders generally are not
personally liable for the torts of the trustees or trust employees
even though committed in furthering the trust's business.7i Those
few states that have statutes in this area generally provide that business trust shareholders are to enjoy the same limited liability as
shareholders of a corporation.75 However, once shareholders begin
to exercise control over the trustees, every state that has considered
the problem has held that they are personally liable for torts committed by the trustees in the furtherance of the trust's business.76
It should be pointed out that even if a state decides that the
trustees or shareholders of a Real Estate Investment Trust should
be liable for torts committed by REIT trustees or employees, as a
69. Sleeper v. Park, 232 Mass. 292, 122 N.E. 315 (1919); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6138A (1970) (REIT trustee liable for wilful torts, malfeasance, or negligence only);
UTAH CoDE ANN. § 16-12-6 (Supp. 1971) (same as Texas). See 3 G. BOGERT, supra note
45, § 300. Contra, ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(3) (Supp. 1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5570-05(c)
(Supp. 1972); 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS 1540 (1939).
70. Falardeau v. Boston Art Students Assn., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N.E. 797 (1903); Prinz
v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 304 (1905). See 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, § 300.
71. Falardeau v. Boston Art Students Assn., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N.E. 797 (1903).
72. Prinz v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 309 (1905).
73. H. HENN, supra note 31, at 403-05.
74. No cases have been found in which a business trust shareholder has been held
liable for torts of the trust in the absence of control of the trustee by the shareholder.
75. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(4) (Supp. 1972); Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 10-509 (Supp.
1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 609.07 (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-5-1-2 (1972) (trust
instrument may provide for limited liability of shareholders); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2035
(1964); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 12:49l(B) (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 78C, § 4 (1969);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 5570-07 (Supp. 1972); MoNT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 15-2505 (Supp. Vol. 2,
1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 174 (1971) (read in conjunction with Hauser v. Catlett,
197 Okla. 668, 173 P.2d 728 (1946)); s.c. CODE ANN. § 52-204 (1962); S.D. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 47-14-10 (1969) (clause in declaration of trust declaring limitation of liability of
shareholders is binding); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1804(4) (1964); TEX. R.Ev. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6138A, § 8 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-12-5 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-350
(1966); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 23.90.020 (1959).
76. Piff v. Berresheim, 405 Ill. 617, 92 N.E.2d 113 (1950); Marchulonis v. Adams, 97
W. Va. 517, 125 S.E. 340 (1924). See generally 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, §§ 294-97.
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practical matter such torts are likely to occur only rarely. The recent trend has been toward the formation of mortgage trusts, 77
which limit their investments to mortgages and other income-producing liens against real property. The income of these trusts is
derived primarily from interest earned and discounts received during the period of amortization of the mortgages.78 It is difficult to
conceive of many situations in which an employee of an organization whose sole business is the buying and selling of mortgages might
commit a tortious act resulting in injury to a member of the public.
It seems more likely that an employee of an equity REIT would
have occasion to cause personal injury by engaging in tortious conduct since equity REITs invest primarily in the mmership of real
property, such as shopping centers, industrial properties, and apartment buildings, which are frequently open to the public.79 Even for
trustees and shareholders of an equity trust, however, there is little
likelihood of being held liable to a member of the public given the
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code that REIT investments
be passive. To qualify for the tax advantages provided by the Real
Estate Investment Trust Act an equity trust must hire an independent contractor to manage and operate its real property.80 If a member of the public is injured on the REIT's property, it is highly
probable that the injury will have been caused not by an employee
of the REIT but by an employee of the independent contractor.
77. Augustine, Introduction to Real Estate Investment Trusts, in REAL EsrATE INTRUSTS II, at 11-12 (Practising Law Institute 1970).
78. Kelley, supra note 7, at 1002. The mortgages may be long term or short term.
Long-term mortgages are acquired as part of a "permanent" portfolio. Short-term
mortgages for construction and other forms of interim financing, which generate a
higher rate of return than the long-term mortgages, are included in the portfolio
in order to increase the earning power of the mortgage trust. Id.
79. Id. These trusts have invested almost exclusively in commercial and industrial
rental real estate, usually subject to mortgages or other incumbrances, and their
primary source of income is from rents.
80. Section 856(d)(!I) of the Code excludes from "rents from real property" any
amount received with respect to real property if the trust "furnishes or renders
services to the tenants of such property, or manages or operates such property,
other than through an independent contractor from whom the trust itself does
not derive or receive any income • • • ." Under this test, if upon audit it is
deemed that the trust received one dollar for services to one or more tenants in
a building generating $100,000 in annual rents, none of the income from that
property will be deemed "rents from real property" and, if more than 10% of
gross income, the trust will be disqualified. These restrictions are a part of the
legislative scheme aimed at limiting the benefits of the real estate investment
trust provisions to trusts which are passive investors in real estate. This particular subsection requires the trusts to engage an independent contractor . . .
for the purpose of I) furnishing or rendering services to the tenants and 2)
managing or operating the real property.
Kelley, supra note 7, at 1006. Trustees must manage the trust but may not manage
or operate the trust property. REIT trustees can I) establish rental terms; 2)
choose tenants; 3) enter into and renew leases; 4) "deal with" taxes, interest, and
insurance relating to tenants' property; 5) make capital expenditures; and 6) make
decisions about repairs and pay their cost. TREAS. R.Ec. § 1.856-4(d) (1962).
VESTMENT
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Under traditional agency principles, one who hires an independent
contractor is not liable for the actions of that contractor's employees. 81 Thus, even if a state decides that REIT trustees or shareholders should be liable for the torts of REIT employees, the
incidence of such liability in practice will be rare.

IV.

EVALUATION OF CURRENT LAW AND
POTENTIAL AVENUES TO REFORM

It is apparent that there are many states where the law on REITs
is either uncertain or unfavorable and many others where there is
no law at all on the questions of tort and contract liability of REIT
trustees and shareholders. It was for these reasons that the House
Ways and Means Committee concluded in 1965 that the use of
REITs had not been so extensive as had been anticipated when the
Real Estate Investment Trust Act was passed in 1960. As the Committee stated:
Real estate investment trusts have not been used as widely since 1960
as might have been anticipated from the type of tax treatment made
available, primarily because of the requirement in the 1960 provision
that the organization itself must be "an unincorporated trust or an
unincorporated association."
In some of the States, the trust form of organization for real estate
investments is not workable or, at best, the law is uncertain.... Even
·with [recent amendments in a few states to ·allow investment in passive real estate investment trusts], however, the application of the law
in the case of real estate investment trusts generally remains uncertain, because the law of governing unincorporated trusts has been
highly developed in only a relatively few States.
. . . [I]t has been found that many investors are reluctant to invest
in trusts, because they do not understand their method of operation.
Many believe that when they invest in trusts they are assuming liabilities and responsibilities to a greater extent than when they invest
in a corporation. Thus, there appears to be a feeling that trust shares
or certificates are not a suitable form of general investment.82
A uniform, predictable legal approach to the liabilities of REIT
trustees and shareholders would do much to stimulate the formation
of and investment in REITs, which was Congress' purpose in enacting the Real Estate Investment Trust Act.83 Attempts to achieve
the desired uniformity and predictability might take one of three
forms: adherence by states to a uniform conflict of laws principle
with respect to REITs, enactment by Congress of federal legislation,
or adoption by states of new or revised substantive law on REITs.
81. See generally w. SEAVEY, AGENCY §§ 6, llE, 82, 84 (1964).
82. H.R. REP. No. 481, supra note 9, at 3.
83. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
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These approaches will be surveyed and evaluated in the discussion
that follows.
A.

Conflict of Laws

It might seem, from the outset, that any fears trustees and shareholders have about possible contract and tort liabilities could be
allayed by forming the trust in a state that would not hold them
so liable. For example, a REIT could file its declaration of trust in
Massachusetts, where trustees may be relieved of liability for business trust contracts and torts by clauses in the trust instrument or
in contracts with third parties84 and where shareholders are not liable
for REIT torts or contracts. 85 The trustees and shareholders would
then be protected by Massachusetts law if state courts adhered to a
conflict-of-laws principle that the law of the state of formation governs disputes involving REIT trustees and shareholders. Such a confilct principle would be analogous to the traditional principle
applicable to corporations: the local law of the state of incorporation
is applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's
liability to the corporation for assessments or contributions and to
its creditors for corporate debts, 86 and to determine the existence
and extent of a director's or officer's liability to the corporation, to
its creditors, and to its shareholders.87 That analogous principles
might be applicable to REITs is recognized by the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, which states that to the extent other forms of
organization, specifically the business trust, enjoy the same attributes
as business corporations, the choice of law rules set out in the chapter
on business corporations should be applicable to them.88
However, it cannot be assumed at present that every state court
will apply the local law of the state of formation in determining
whether to hold REIT trustees or shareholders liable for REIT
torts and debts. First, there are no traditional conflict-of-laws rules
applicable to business trusts. The Resiatement says that, to date,
84. E.g., Downey Co. v. 282 Beacon St. Trust, 292 Mass. 175, 197 N.E. 643 (1935);
Rand v. Farquhar, 226 Mass. 91, 115 N.E. 286 (1917); Shoe & Leather Natl. Bank v.
Dix, 123 Mass. 148 (1877).
85. E.g., Commissioner v. City of Springfield, 321 Mass. 31, 71 N.E.2d 593 (1947);
Greco v. Hubbard, 252 Mass. 37, 147 N.E. 272 (1925); Falardeau v. Boston Art Students Assn., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N.E. 797 (1903).
86. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLicr OF LA.ws § 307 (1971).
87. Id. § 309.
88. Id., Introductory Note to ch. 13.
That most people who form REITs feel these conflict rules will be applied to
REITs is strongly suggested by the great number of REITs, no matter where their
headquarters are located, that are formed in Massachusetts. Out of 112 REITs listed
in MOODY'S INVEsrOR SERVICE, INC., BANK AND FINANCE MANUAL 1311-1592 (1972), 48
were formed in Massachusetts; another 25 were formed in California, Maryland, and
Texas, all of which are friendly to REIT trustees and shareholders.

822

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:808

forms of organization other than the corporation and partnership
"have engaged the attention of the courts only rarely in the field
of choice of law." 89 Moreover, the Restatement position is that the
choice-of-law rules applicable to corporations should apply to business trusts, but only to the extent that the latter enjoy the same
attributes as business corporations.90 The most important attribute
of a business corporation, according to the Restatement, is limitation
of the liability of the shareholder for any act or omission of the
corporation.91 Since it has not been universally held that shareholders
of a business trust are not liable for the acts or omissions of the
trust92 and since, indeed, the case at bar might concern the very
issue of whether to hold a shareholder liable for such acts, it cannot
be stated with any certainty that every court will apply the corporate
choice-of-law rules in litigation involving a Real Estate Investment
Trust. Finally, the Restatement recognizes an exception to the traditional choice of law rules applicable to corporations: with respect
to the particular issue whose resolution necessitates a choice of law,
if some state other than the state of incorporation has a more significant relationship to the parties and the transaction, a court will
apply the law of the other state.93 Thus, even if a court should decide
to apply corporate choice-of-law rules to a controversy involving a
REIT, it would not necessarily use the substantive law of the state
of formation to resolve that controversy.
If a court decides that corporate conflict rules do not apply to
REITs, it will be faced with deciding which state's laws should be
applied to determine the extent of REIT trustee and shareholder
liability. In one analysis of REITs, the authors stated: "The essential question is whether a state court will select the law of the forum,
the law of the REIT's property situs or the law of the state of REIT
origin." 94 To this list could be added the law of the state where the
contract was signed or was to be performed, the law of the state
where the tort occurred, the law of the state where the REIT carries
on most of its business, and the law of the state where the REIT has
its· headquarters.95
89. RESTATEMENT, supra note 86, Introductory Note to ch. 13.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See text accompanying notes 58-67 8: 73-76 supra.
93. RESTATEMENT, supra note 86, §§ 6, 309.
94. T. ALLEN 8: W. DERRICK, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS A-40 (107-2d, Ta.x
Management, 1972).
95. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to examine all the factors that a state
should consider in deciding in each case which of these laws should apply, or to
discuss how various theories on conflict of laws promoted by various commentators
would approach this specific problem. See Comment, Limited Liability of Shareholders in Real Estate Investment Trusts and the Conflict of Laws, 50 CALIF. L
REv. 696 (1962); Note, The Real Estate Investment Trust in Multistate Activity, 48
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It should be noted that even if a court does not apply the law
of the state of REIT formation and chooses the law of the forum
or of some other state, there are few states whose law is particularly
harsh on REIT trustees or shareholders. If a REIT simply avoided
formation or investment in these few states, it could minimize the
chance that their unfavorable law would ever be applied in a case
in which the liability of the REIT's shareholders or trustees is at
issue.
Up to this point, however, attention has not been given to the
situation in which a court decides that the law to be applied to
determine trustee or shareholder liability in a particular case is that
of a state that has no law at all on the subject. In such a situation,
the court will have to guess what the other state would hold on the
matter of trustee or shareholder liability. Logically, the court might
conclude that the other state would adopt the majority opinion
among states that have considered the problem. This conclusion
would result in nonliability for both the shareholders and trustees
if the trust instrument and third-party contracts contain clauses that
provide for such nonliability. However, there is no certainty that a
court would so decide.
The absence of firm conflict rules with respect to business trusts
creates an atmosphere of uncertainty for REIT trustees and shareholders. Just as it is generally recognized that a uniform and predictable treatment of corporations is desirable and that a single body of
law should govern a corporation's operations to the extent possible,96
so does the resurgence of the business trust raise the need for a reasonably predictable legal environment.97 Probably the easiest way to
achieve a uniform result in this area is for a state always to apply the
law of the state where the trust was formed in determining trustee
and shareholder liability. This solution would allow the trustee anq
shareholder to know their potential liabilities from the very inception of the undertaking. It would eliminate the need, which more
complex choice-of-law rules would create, to decide on the facts of
each and every case which state's substantive law should apply. 98 UnVA. L. R.Ev. 1125 (1962). See generally, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE·OF-LAW PROCESS
(1965); A. VON MEHREN &: D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965);
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE LJ. 171;
Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules", 49 CALIF. L. REv.
240 (1961); Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 463 (1960); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959).

96. See A. BADR, ALIEN CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT OF LAws
CONFLICT OF LAws 3 (1947).

89 (1953); 2

E. RABEL,

97. Comment, supra note 95, at 701.
98. For example, if a state decided that the conflict rule to be applied to business
trusts were the rule of most significant contacts, it would then have to decide which

824

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:808

der the proposed solution, a REIT, which is in practically every
respect like a corporation, 99 would be treated as a corporation. Finally, this solution would reflect the result reached by most of the
business trust cases involving conflict of laws. 100
A possible qualification to this solution is that a court might employ the doctrine that the law of another state cannot be applied
if it contravenes the public policy of the forum state.101 Under this
doctrine, a forum might decide that it should not apply the law of
the state of formation in litigation involving a REIT. However,
such decisions should be rare. A statute of another state is not contrary to the forum state's public policy merely because the forum
has no statute on the subject,102 nor is a public policy conflict created
by a mere variance between the law of another state and that of the
forum.1oa
However, unless and until the conflict-of-laws rule suggested
above is adopted by all of the states with which a REIT, its trustees,
and its shareholders have connections, the risk remains that one of
those states might apply the law of a state other than the state of
formation and hold the trustee or shareholders liable for contracts
or torts of the REIT. For a large REIT with holdings, trustees, and
shareholders in many states this risk could be substantial. It seems
apparent, then, that sufficient uniformity and certainty in the area
of REIT trustee and shareholder liabilities cannot be achieved, at
least in the immediate future, unless Congress alters the requirement that REITs be business trusts or states reform their business
trust laws.
B. Possible Congressional Action

While potential investors in real estate could avoid any possibility of personal liability by operating in corporate form rather than
as a REIT, corporations do not qualify for the special tax treatment
given to REITs. The Internal Revenue Code specifically provides
contacts of the particular REIT before it were "significant" and to which state they
related.. This might be difficult in the case of a large REIT holding property or
mortgages in many states,
99. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
100. E.g., Gutelius v. Stanbon, 39 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1929); Dunning v. Gibbs, 213
Ky. 81, 280 S.W. 483 (1926) (dictum); Marchulonis v. Adams, 97 W. Va, 517, 125 S.E.
340 (1924). See generally Comment, supra note 95; Note, supra note 95, at 1137-48.
101. See, e.g., Means v. Limpia Royalties, 115 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ, App. 1938);
Farmers' &: Merchants' Natl. Bank v. Anderson, 216 Iowa 988, 250 N.W. 214 (1933)
(applying forum law to exonerate beneficiary).
102. E.g., Warner v. Florida Bank &: Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947);
Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947).
103. E.g., Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941); Broderick v.
McGuire, 119 Conn. 83, 174 A. 314 (1934). See generally Paulsen &: Sovern, "Public
Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM, L. REv. 969 (1956).
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that to qualify, a business must be either an unincorporated trust or
an unincorporated association.104
The problem of potential REIT trustee and shareholder liability
could be alleviated if Congress were to amend section 856 of the
Internal Revenue Code to allow corporations to qualify as REITs.
Congress could state that if a corporation met all the requirements
as to sources of income and diversification of assets that are set down
in sections 856-58 of the Code, it would not be taxed on any of its
income that it distributed to shareholders as long as it distributed
at least ninety per cent of its net income. Such a plan would come
much closer to equalizing the treatment between shareholders in
mutual funds and the shareholders in Real Estate Investment Trusts,
an express goal of Congress in passing the Real Estate Investment
Trust Act. 105 Presently, mutual funds also must meet rigid asset and
income requirements and distribute at least ninety per cent of their
income in order to avoid federal taxation of amounts that they distribute to shareholders; 106 unlike REITs, however, they are corporations and thus can guarantee limited liability to their shareholders,
a guarantee that REITs cannot make at present. The proposed plan
would not hinder the encouragement of investment in real estate,
which Congress tried to foster in 1960; 107 indeed, it might encourage
even more real estate investment, for many small investors who have
been afraid of the potential liabilities associated with the business
trust form might be attracted to real estate investment corporations.108
An attempt was in fact made in 1965 to amend the Real Estate
Investment Trust Act so that corporations could qualify as REITs
and be eligible for the tax advantages granted such entities. The bill,
H.R. 4260, 109 would have provided that real estate investment corporations that met the conditions specified in the statute now applicable to real estate investment trusts would be eligible for "pass
through" tax treatment if ninety per cent or more of their income
were distributed to shareholders.110 Although the bill was endorsed
104. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a).
105. H.R. REP. No. 2020, supra note 25, at 3.
106. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-55.
107. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
108. H.R. REP. No. 481, supra note 9, at 3. As the House Ways and Means Committee stated in 1965, after considering such a plan as has just been discussed:
[There is] no logical reason for granting regulated investment type treatment to
real estate trusts and not to similarly situated real estate corporations. Moreover,
making this treatment available to such real estate investment corporations would
be particularly helpful to the small investor who has little understanding of the
operations of trusts and who, therefore, would otherwise be unlikely to obtain a
holding in any real estate parcel of relatively large maguitude.
Id.
109. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
llO. The bill also would have amended the present requirement that the business
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by the House Ways and Means Committee111 and passed unanimously by the House of Representatives,112 it apparently died in
the Senate Finance Committee. No hearings were ever held in the
Senate on the bill, it was never reported out of the Committee, and
no legislative history can be found on the bill after it left the House
floor.
No new movement to pass such an amendment has risen in Congress since that time. Thus, while the problem of REIT shareholder
and trustee liability could easily be solved by Congress' allowing
corporations to qualify as REITs, there is no indication that Congress is going to pass such an amendment, at least in the immediate
future. The present problem of uncertain liabilities thus devolves
upon the individual states for solution.
C.

Possible State Action

In determining to what extent liability for REIT torts and debts
should be imposed on the trustees and shareholders, states can find
little guidance in the congressional history of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act. There is nothing in the Congressional Record, in
the Committee report accompanying the REIT Bill,118 or in any
other source that indicates what, if anything, Congress intended in
regard to such liabilities when it passed the original Act. Only one
bit of legislative history suggests that Congress has even considered
this problem: As noted above, when the House Ways and Means
Committee endorsed the 1965 bill that would have allowed corporations to qualify for REIT status, it did so on the ground that the
bill, by assuring small investors limited liability, would encourage
them to invest in real estate ventures. However, the Senate's failure
to act on the bill leaves unclear what inferences might be drawn
from the bill's history about Congress' intentions.
I.

Contractual Liability

In deciding whether to hold the trustee or shareholder liable for
the contracts of a REIT, a state should probably look first to the
law that is applied to the corporation, the entity most similar to the
REIT. In fact, the business corporation and the REIT are virtually
identical in their formal characteristics: I) each has centralized management; 2) each is formed for the purpose of carrying on some kind
be managed by one or more trustees and provided an alternative to the effect that
the corporation could be managed by persons who bore a comparable fiduciary relationship to the shareholders as do REIT trustees to the beneficial owners of the
trust. H.R. REP. No. 481, supra note 9, at 3-4.
111. Id. at 3.
112. 111 CONG. R.Ec. 13964 (1965).
113. H.R. REP. No. 2020, supra note 25.
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of commercial activity for profit; 3) beneficial interests in the assets
of each are evidenced by freely transferable certificates; and 4) the
existence or life of each is not affected by the death, disability, or
retirement of a shareholder, or by the sale or transfer of his interest.114 Since corporations and REITs are alike in so many respects,
it would seem logical to hold that if corporate shareholders and officers are not personally liable for the contracts of their corporation,
then their counterparts-the REIT shareholders and trusteesshould not be held personally liable for the debts of the Real Estate
Investment Trust.
However, there is one major difference between a REIT and a
corporation: a corporation is a legal entity or artificial person distinct
from the shareholders who own it,115 while a REIT is not. Indeed,
it is because the corporation assumes obligations as a legal entity that
shareholders have not been held personally liable for corporate contracts and other debts. 116 Moreover, the corporation's status as a legal
person allows the principles governing the liability of agents to third
persons to be applied in the corporate setting, with the result that
officers have not been held personally liable on corporate contracts
executed by them.117 Thus, since a REIT is not an independent legal
entity like a corporation, it is arguable that the corporate analogy
does not really apply.
Although this distinction is cogent on its face, it is not persuasive
when practical considerations are examined. So long as the REIT
creditor is in no worse position than the corporate creditor, the fact
that a REIT is not a legal entity is irrelevant. Since corporate officers
and shareholders are normally immune from liability for the corporation's debts, a corporate creditor's recovery will generally be limited to the assets of the corporation.118 A state could put the REIT
creditor in the same position as the corporate creditor by imposing
personal liability on the trustee for REIT contracts while limiting
the creditor's recovery to the value of the REIT assets, by permitting
the trustee to reimburse himself from those assets, and by immunizII4. Caplin, Foreword, 48 VA. L. REY. 1007 (1962).
A famous business trust case carried the analogy even further: The corpus of the
trust corresponds to the capital of the incorporated company; the trustees to the board
of directors; the beneficiaries to the stockholders; the beneficial interests to shares of
stock; and the declaration of trust to the charter. Schumann-Heink. v. Folsom, 328 Ill.
321, 325-26, 159 N.E. 250, 252 (1927).
Historically, the application of trust principles to the conduct of commercial enterprise originated in Massachusetts as a result of the inability to secure corporate charters for acquiring and developing real estate without a special act of the legislature.
Caplin, supra, at 1007.
ll5. 13 A. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 6213 (1961).
116. Id.
117. 3 id. § lll7 (1931).
118. See text accompanying notes 43 &: 58 supra.
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ing REIT shareholders from liability except in situations where
corporate shareholders would be liable. A similar way to accomplish
the same end would be to hold that neither the trustee nor the shareholder shall be personally liable for REIT debts but that the REIT
per se can be sued in the courts of the state. Suits directly against the
trust have in fact been allowed in a few states,119 This solution, however, may prove too radical for states that cannot conceive of an
unincorporated organization being sued in its own name.
From a practical standpoint, the scheme of holding the trustee
liable to the extent of REIT assets for REIT contracts would allow
the average shareholder, who has no real control of the daily operations of the REIT, to be free from liability. It would subject the
persons most closely identified with the everyday operations of the
trust-the trustees-to responsibility for the contracts they undertake without burdening them with debts that are not imposed on
their corporate counterparts. Finally, under the proposed scheme the
creditor of a REIT would be just as well off as a creditor of a corporation, for he could recover up to the full amount of the REIT's
assets.120 A creditor who desired more security could ask the trustee
to sign the contract and guarantee it in his own name, just as a corporate creditor who wants to be assured of a recovery that exceeds the
extent of corporate assets can ask for a corporate officer's personal
guaranty. Thus, the proposed scheme would treat like entities alike,
assure uniformity and certainty, and abate the fears of potential investors, without affecting the availability of the federal tax advantage
given to the Real Estate Investment Trust form.
119. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 182 (1960); WIS, STAT. ANN. § 226.14(11)
(Supp. 1973). See also G. BOGERT, supra note 45, § 302 n.59.
120. To qualify for federal pass-through tax treatment, a REIT must distribute at
_least 90 per cent of its income. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(l). In contrast, a cor•
poration generally retains a greater percentage of its income. In the aggregate, Ameri•
can corporations have distributed slightly over 50 per cent of their profits after taxes
in recent years. 93 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL .ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED
STATES r,tv. Lerner ed. 1972). While this difference in distribution patterns might seem
to create a disparity in the assets available to satisfy creditors of REITs and corpora•
tions, there are several factors that mitigate this apparent disparity. First, the REIT
only distributes 90 per cent of its income that is left after all current liabilities have
been met. Furthermore, equity REITs by definition invest in real property, which
appreciates in value, see text accompanying note 79 supra, whereas corporations gen•
erally invest in assets that depreciate in value. Although mortgage REITs, see text
accompanying notes 77-78 supra, do not invest directly in appreciable assets, the mort•
gages they hold are secured by real property. The only situation in which a mortgage
REIT might be unable to pay its creditors would be that in which many of its mortgagors defaulted on their payments. In such a situation, the REIT or its creditors
could foreclose on the underlying real property. Finally, most of the creditors of
REITs are banks and other financial institutions. See generally Robertson, Sorting Out
the Real Estate Investment Trusts, FORTUNE, Aug. 1970, at 173-75; Schulkin, Real Estate
Investment Trusts: A New Finandal Intermediary, NEW ENGLAND EcoN, REv., Nov-Dec.
1970, at 2. It could be expected that such institutions generally will not lend money to
a REIT unless they are assured that its assets will be sufficient to pay back the loan.
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2. Tort Liability
A state must also consider whether a trustee should be personally
liable for the torts of a fellow trustee or of personnel he has hired
to carry on the trust's business, and whether a shareholder should be
personally liable for such REIT torts. The solution that was suggested in the area of contract liability would seem equally appropriate here: that the trustee shall be personally liable for the torts
of the REIT's employees but only to the extent of the REIT assets;
that the trustee shall be permitted to reimburse himself from the
trust assets; and that the shareholders shall not be liable except in
the situations in which corporate shareholders would be liable. This
would leave all the parties in the same relative position as their corporate counterparts.
The decision whether to hold REIT shareholders or trustees liable for REIT torts is not a serious problem for two reasons. First,
as noted above, torts by REIT trustees or employees are likely to
occur infrequently.121 Second, public liability insurance can be obtained at relatively little expense to cover potential trustee and shareholder liability.122
121. See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
122. Telephone conversation of February 15, 1973, with Mr. Lawrence London,
United Underwriters, Cleveland, Ohio.
Insurance may render obsolete some of the traditional common-law arguments that
have been offered in favor of or against holding the trustees or shareholders liable for
REIT torts. For example, it could be argued that imposing liability on a trustee for
the torts of people he has hired to carry on the trust's business would tend to encourage
a trustee to make sure that his fellow trustees and employees exercise caution in the
execution of the trust's business. This is one of the justifications that have been given
for respondeat superior in the law of agency. See W. SEAVEY, supra note 81, § 83. In
addition, such liability might also cause the trustee to be much more selective in his
hiring of employees. See id. Insurance, by insulating the trustee from personal loss,
might weaken the effect of liability on the trustee's conduct. Two other reasons are
generally given to justify respondeat superior: 1) the "deep pocket" theory, under
which it is assumed that the master is more likely to be able to pay an injured person
than the employee who injured the person, and 2) the "spread the loss" theory, under
which it is assumed that the principal can more easily spread the cost of paying the
injured person, through raising prices, than can the employee. See generally Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
In the absence of insurance, the "deep pocket" theory might not be particularly
applicable to a REIT trustee, who may have limited personal assets. The "spread the
loss" theory is likely to be unaffected by the availability of insurance.
With respect to the liability of a REIT shareholder for the torts of employees, it
could be argued that shareholders invest in REITs to make a profit and that it is only
fair that they be prepared to suffer some losses. Insurance would insulate shareholders
from personal loss arising out of the REITs' operations. Another argument for shareholder liability is that it will provide another source of assets for people who are injured
by employees of the undertaking. However, so long as the REIT trustee carries maximum insurance, there is no need for another source of assets. On the other hand, two
reasons are generally given to justify the limited liability of corporate shareholders:
1) it encourages industry by allowing incorporated enterprises to avoid the expense of
fully funding their enterprise, and 2) it makes it easier for corporations to offer their
shares to the public. See Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts
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Another approach to the problem of liabilities for REIT torts
and contracts is offered by the Midwest Securities Commissioners
Statement of Policy Regarding REITs.123 This Statement was issued
by the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, an association
of the securities administrators of twenty-four states,124 and was intended to be a model for state regulation of the sale of REIT shares.
It requires, among other things, that the declaration of trust provide
that the shareholder shall not be personally liable for any of the
obligations of the trust, that all written contracts to which the trust
is a party provide that the shareholders and beneficial owners shall
not be liable thereon, and that the trustees maintain adequate insurance against possible tort liability on the part of the trust.125 However, the Statement is not an effective solution to the problem, for
it merely regulates the sale of securities in a state and does not alter
the state's general tort or contract law. Moreover, because the Statement requires that substantial powers be given to shareholders, adoption of the Statement in states employing the control test might
actually increase the incidence of shareholder liability.126
V.

TAX LIABILITIES

Liabilities of Nonresident REIT Shareholders for
Income Tax of State Where REIT Owns Property

A.

One contemplating investment in a REIT, in addition to being
cognizant of potential personal liability for the contracts and torts
of REIT personnel, must also be aware that he might have to pay
of Their Corporation?, 76 YALE L.J. ll90, ll95-98 (1967). These arguments, which would
apply equally to REITs and REIT shareholders, may carry less weight if potential
investors knew they could protect themselves from liabilities arising from a corporation's operations by procuring insurance.
123. l CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1f1f 4751-57 (1969).
124. Arizona; Arkansas; California; Colorado; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas;
Kentucky; Michigan; Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska; New Mexico; North Dakota; Ohio;
Oklahoma; South Dakota; Texas; Utah; Washington; Wisconsin; Wyoming. 1 CCH
BLUE SKY L. REP. 1[ 4751 (1969).
125. I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. ,r 4754 (1969). The Statement also attempts to control such matters as the manner of election of trustees and amendments of the declaration of trust. In addition, it imposes limitations upon expenses and prohibits certain
types of investments and the issuance of securities of more than one class. Id.
126. The trustee or trustees may be removed by the vote or written consent of
two thirds of the outstanding shares of beneficial interest, changes can be made in
the declaration of trust or other instruments forming the trust with the vote or
written consent of two thirds of the outstanding shares, and the trust may be terminated at any time by a vote or the written consent of two thirds of the outstanding
shares. 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1f 4754 (1969). Under the control test applied to
business trusts, if a shareholder had a combination of these powers, he was deemed to have
control of the trust and was held liable for its debts. See cases cited in note 63 supra.
The Midwest Statement is not binding, either in whole or in part, on any of the
individual member states of the Association unless it is expressly adopted or followed
by the individual state. Indeed, very few of the member states have in fact adopted
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income taxes to every state in which the REIT owns real estate.
The statutes of states that impose a personal income tax contain, in
some form, provisions that a nonresident shall be liable for taxes on
all income derived from real or personal property located in the
state, on all rents, dividends, and other income derived from real
property located in the state, and on all capital gains derived from
real or personal property located in the state.127 However, the potential state tax liability of REIT shareholders is mitigated by several factors. First, several states have provisions in their statutes
giving a nonresident a credit for any taxes paid to his domiciliary
state on income earned from property in those states.128 For example,
suppose shareholder S lived in state Y and his REIT invested in
property in state X. X would give a credit to S on his X state income
tax return for any tax paid to state Y on income derived from property in state X. Moreover, many of the states that have an income
tax give their own residents credit for any taxes they have paid to
another state on income derived from property located in that other
state.129
In addition, many state statutes declare that cash dividends shall
be taxed only in the domiciliary state of a stockholder.130 Moreover,
some statutes provide that dividends paid to nonresidents shall not be
taxable in the state where the property that generated the dividends
is located unless the property is used in a business, trade, or profesthis policy statement as their own law, possibly because of such overly restrictive provisions as the limitations on investments in land contracts, on unsecured borrowing,
and on issuance of securities of more than one class. See Nelson, Regulation of REITs
by the Midwest States in REAL EsrATE INVESI"MENT TRUsrs 95 (R. Needham ed. 1969).
Of the member states, only Michigan has formally adopted this policy. 2 CCH BLUE
SKY L. REP. 1)1) 25,638-52 (1972). Two nonmember states have also adopted the policy:
Mississippi, id. 1) 25,641 (1964); Tennessee, 3 id. 1) 45,626 (1967). A number of other
states, member and nonmember-Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia-although they have not officially
adopted the Midwest Statement, nevertheless use it as a guide. Epstein, State Securities
Regulation of Real Estate Invsetment Trusts, 23 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 514, 521 (1971).
127. E.g., CAL. REv. 8: TAX. CODE § 17071 (West 1970); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120,
§§ l!-302 to -307 (1971); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 62, § 5A (Supp. 1971); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 206.101-24 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. TAX LAW § 632 (McKinney 1966); Omo REv.
CoDE ANN. § 5747.20 (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7303, 7308 (Supp.
1972). Contra, LA. REv. STAT• .ANN. § 47:53.3 (1970) (no tax due on dividends received
from REITs since REITs are taxed directly on all income, see LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:31 (1970)).
128. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-128(b) (Supp. 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-B:6 (1970) (reciprocity); WIS. STAT• .ANN. § 71.03(2) (1969).
129. E.g., MAss• .ANN. LAws ch. 62, § 6(a) (1971); MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 206.255
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. TAX LAw § 620 (McKinney 1966); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 5747.05
(Page Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7314 (Supp. 1972).
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 3-301(2) (1971); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 206.113
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. TAX LAw § 632 (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-05
(1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2358 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-30-32
(Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-279.1 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-68 (1963).
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sion by the nonresident in that state.131 Presumably these statutes
would exempt a nonresident REIT shareholder from paying taxes
to these states on the REIT dividends.
Finally, ·it is questionable whether a state could constitutionally
tax a nonresident when his only connection with the state is his ownership of shares of a REIT which invests in that state. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently held that a state may not tax
a person unless it has jurisdiction over him.132 It has stated: "As to
nonresidents, the jurisdiction [to tax] extends only to their property
owned within the state and their business, trade or profession carried on therein; and the tax is only on such income as is derived
from these sources." 133 In light of this language, it is not clear that
a state would have jurisdiction over a nonresident shareholder of a
REIT that owns property in the state. REIT property is owned by
the REIT trustee134 and not by the shareholder. Moreover, the
REIT's business within the state is carried on by the REIT trustee
and not by the nonresident shareholder. Finally, the income that
the shareholder receives is not earned directly from the property
in the state, but indirectly in the form of dividends.
_ International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation,1315 however, lends support to the imposition of a tax on the
dividends of a nonresident REIT shareholder, at least to the extent
that such dividends are derived from property located in the taxing
state. In that case the Supreme Court upheld a Wisconsin law186 that
placed a tax on all dividends distributed by a foreign corporation to
all of its stockholders, regardless of whether they were Wisconsi~
residents, in proportion to the income which the corporation earned
within Wisconsin. Although this tax was collected from the corporation and not from its shareholders, the Court acknowledged that
the incidence of the tax was in fact on the shareholders. Nevertheless,
the Court stated: "A state may tax such part of the income of a nonresident as is fairly attributable either to property located in the
state or to events and transactions which, occurring there, are subject
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1122 (Supp. 1970); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 235-27
(1968); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2705 (1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-23 (Supp. 1971);
N.Y. TAX LAW § 632 (McKinney 1964); R.I. GEN. LAws .ANN. § 44-30-32 (Supp. 1971);
s.c. CODE ANN. § 65-279.1 (1962). Cf. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-123(dd) (Supp. 1972),
providing that a taxpayer may deduct dividends received from a corporation subject
to tax in Arizona. "Corporation" includes a business trust. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43lOlG) (1956).
132. American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965); Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S.
435 (1940); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
133. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920).
134. 3 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 65, § 43.11.
135. 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
136. Law of Sept. 26, 1935, ch. 505, § 3, [1935] Wis. Stat. 961.
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to state regulation .... "137 However, the fact that no other state has
attempted to tax corporate dividends distributed to nonresidents1 ~ 8
seems to indicate that there is substantial doubt about the viability
of the International Harvester decision. Even Wisconsin, after a long
history of constitutional debate within the state, finally let its controversial statute lapse in 1951.139
Another avenue to taxation of nonresident REIT shareholders
would be opened if the Court were to hold that REIT shares are
interests in land, rather than intangibles like corporate stock. In
1935, in Senior v. Braden,140 the Court did hold that business trust
shares are interests in land. If this decision is still good law, a state
with jurisdiction over a REIT's real estate could tax a nonresident
shareholder on the portion of his REIT dividends attributable to
that real property.141 However, Justice Stone, in a strong dissent in
Senior, argued that business trust shares are no different from other
intangibles and that the holder really has none of the incidents of
legal ownership of the real estate that the shares represent.142 As one
commentator has stated, it is impossible to guess how the Court
would now resolve this issue.143

B. Liability of REIT for State Corporate Income Taxes
Among the states that have a corporate income tax the patterns
of REIT taxation vary. Thirteen states directly incorporate the federal law and provide that those entities that qualify for REIT status
under the Internal Revenue Code144 shall be taxed only on income
that they have not distributed to shareholders.145 Six states partially
137. 322 U.S. at 441-42.
It could be argued on the basis of International Harvester that a state may tax
dividends distributed to nonresident REIT shareholders and earned by the REIT
from property located in the state. As in International Harvester, the state might have
to collect the tax directly from the business rather than from its shareholders. First,
it is possible that although the Court upheld a tax on the distribution of dividends to
nonresident shareholders, it might not uphold a tax placed on the receipt of such
dividends. Second, the administrative burden of assessing such a tax directly upon
nonresident shareholders and of attempting to collect the assessments would likely
prove overwhelming.
lll8. At least no evidence has been found of any other state's attempting to do this.
139. See Teschner, The Death of a Tax, 1953 Wis. L. REv. '76.
140. 295 U.S. 422 (1935).
141. See, e.g., Travis v. Yale &: Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
142. 295 U.S. at 433-41.
143. 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 45, § 308, at 629.
144. !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856-58.
145. CAL. REv. &: TAX. CoDE § 24413 (West Supp. 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ lll8•1•58 (Supp. 1965); GA. CoDE ANN. § 92-3105 (1961); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 235-7l(d)
(Supp. 1971); !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(d)(2)(D) (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 313A (1969); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 8(b)(l) (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 290.09(28) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. TAX LAw § 209(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN.
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incorporate the federal law through a "piggyback" tax scheme. Under this scheme, a business trust must pay the regular corporate
income tax, but only on federal taxable income, which for a REIT
is its undistributed income.146 Nine states provide that only those
entities that are taxed as corporations by the federal government are
liable for the corporate income tax,147 thus probably excluding the
REIT. Five states apparently subject the REIT to corporate income
tax on all of its taxable income derived from the state.148
In the rest of the states, "corporations" are defined as corporations, joint stock companies, associations, and, in some states, insurance companies.149 Whether a REIT would be considered an association subject to this corporate tax is not clear. A few old cases held
that business trusts were liable for the state corporate tax,150 but
none was decided in a state whose current statute defines "corporation" in the manner described above. In the absence of a specific
exemption, REITs would likely be considered associations subject
to the state corporate income tax. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that the wording of these statutes parallels the Internal Revenue Code,151 under which business trusts have been considered associations subject to the federal corporation taxes.152
STAT. § 105-130.12 (1972); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 5733.040) (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2359 (Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-223.1 (Supp. 1971).
146. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 220.03, .12 (1972); IDAHO CODE§§ 63-3006, -3022 (Supp. 1972);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 64-3203, -3210 (Supp. 1972); MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. §§ 84-1501, -1504
(1966); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 77-2734 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. §§ 44-11-1, -11
(1970).
147. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 30, § 1901 (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32.109 (Supp.
1971); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5102(6) (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN.
§ 206.81(1) (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-2 (Supp. 1971); ORE. R.Ev. STAT.
§ 316.012 (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5811 (1970); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-24-3
(Supp. 1970) (however, an annual privilege tax may apply, W. VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 11-13-1
to -25). A tenth state indirectly incorporates the federal law by stating that the income
of a business trust shall be taxed as property held in trust-that is, taxed only on
income which is not distributed to beneficiaries. ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 29(8) (Supp. 1971).
148. ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 43-101 (1956); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 47:31 (1970)
(states specifically that REITs are subject to corporate income tax on all income);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2701 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-1 (1963); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 226.14(10) (1957).
149. ALAs. STAT. § 43.20.340 (1971); .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2002(5) (1960); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 12-213 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.32 (1971); Mo. REv. STAT. § 143.441
(Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-01 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401 (Supp.
1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.02(d) (Supp. 1972). In four of these states, however, even
if a REIT is deemed a corporation, it will only pay state income tax on the income
which it has not distributed to shareholders, for the tax is based on the entity's federal
taxable income. ALAs. STAT. § 43.20.010 (1971); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. § 143.431 (Supp. 1973);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-01.1 (1972): VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.032 (Supp. 1972).
150. New York City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Graves, 272 N.Y. 1, 3 N.E.2d 612
(1936); People ex rel. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Lynch, 265 N.Y. 593, 193 N.E. 335 (1934);
Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. Oklahoma Tax Commr., 197 Okla. 114, 168 P.2d 607 (1946);
Ellinger v. Tax Commn., 229 Wis. 71, 281 N.W. 701 (1938).
151. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 770l(a)(3).
152. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Helvering v. Combs,
296 U.S. 365 (1935).
·
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C. Liability of REIT for State Corporate Franchise Taxes
In addition to corporate income taxes, many states have corporate
franchise or excise taxes based on the value of the corporation's
capital stock; again, it is unclear whether REITs are subject to these
taxes. Three states specifically state that business trusts are liable for
these taxes,1 53 while two states indirectly impose these taxes on business trusts. 154 Most states, however, do not explicitly address this
problem: several states do not define "corporations" in their corporation franchise tax statutes but nevertheless talk in terms of articles
of incorporation or incorporated entities, thus seemingly excluding
REITs from such taxation; 155 several others define "corporations" as
all corporations, joint stock companies, associations, or other business
organizations that have privileges, powers, rights, or immunities not
possessed by individuals; 156 one state declares that an entity must
pay the corporation franchise taxes if it pays corporate income
tax to the state. 157

VI.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF TAXATION AND FACTORS
RELEVANT TO A STATE'S CHOICE OF METHOD

In addition to the methods of REIT income taxation described
above, at least two other possible methods might be employed. First,
in that REITs perform many of the same functions as banks and
other financial institutions-particularly lending money for investment in real estate with the loans secured by mortgages-the state
could tax REITs in the same manner that it taxes such financial
institutions. Second, since REITs are similar in certain respects to
mutual funds,1 58 a state, if it has a special tax scheme for mutual
funds, could extend this scheme to cover REITs.
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:IOA-4 (Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1201
(1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2902 (Supp. 1972).
154. WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. §§ 23.90.040, 23A.40.060 (Supp. 1972) (business trusts
are liable for all taxes which corporations must pay); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-12-78,
11-12-80, 47-9A-5 (1966) (business trusts are liable for all corporate license fees and
taxes).
155. Au... CODE, tit. 51, §§ 347-51 (Supp. 1971); .ARK. STAT, ANN. § 84-1833 (1960);
CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-10-6, -7 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 501 (Supp. 1970);
ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.131, .138 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7501 (Supp. 1972);
KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 136.070 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 147.010 (Supp. 1971);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-303, -306 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-122 (1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 57.767, .769 (1971); R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. § 44-12-1 (1970); TEX. TAX-GEN. art.
12.01 (1969); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-46 (1965).
156. LA.. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:601 to :616 (1970); Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 9313-14 (Supp.
1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7602 (Supp.
1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-456 (1969).
157. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-606 (Supp. 1971). Theoretically, then, a REIT which distributes one hundred per cent of its income should not be liable for this corporate
franchise tax since by S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-223.1 (Supp. 1971) a REIT need not pay
any income tax on income which it pays to its shareholders.
158. Both RElTs and mutual funds provide a pooling arrangement, with beneficial
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The number of factors that a state must consider in deciding
which tax plan to adopt makes such a decision extremely complex.
No one plan is best suited for all states, nor can a recommendation
be made to any particular state without knowing all the facts that
prevail in that state. The complexity of the problem can best be
demonstrated by the following example. It might appear that if a
state strongly desires an inflow of capital investment, it could accomplish this result by setting low rates of taxation on REIT income. Yet the solution is not so simple. In addition to the state's
low income tax rates, the REIT trustees will compare the real property taxes, real estate transfer taxes, payroll taxes, and mortgage
transfer taxes of the state to those of other states to determine where
investment would be most advantageous. The trustees will also compare the expected rate of return on invested capital in the state
·with that in other states. If the REIT is of the equity variety, consideration will be given to the availability of qualified independent
contractors in the area who can manage the trust's properties.1119
Therefore, a low tax rate on REIT income will not necessarily ensure a large flow of capital investment into the state.
It might also seem that if a state is in need of tax revenue, it
should not tax REIT income at a relatively low rate. However, insofar as the tax rate does influence the inflow of capital, a high rate
might in some circumstances deter REITs from investing in the
state, resulting in a smaller base of aggregate REIT income subject
to the state's taxation and thus a smaller amount of total tax revenue derived from REITs than if REITs were taxed at a relatively
low rate. Furthermore, to the extent that REIT investment has a
multiplier effect on a state's economic activity, a tax rate so high that
it deters REIT investment may have a retarding effect on total income and thus on total tax revenue generated in the state. Therefore, the factors that must be considered by a state in devising a
scheme for taxing REIT income are so numerous and complex that
a generalized solution cannot be formulated.
Many of the same complex factors are involved in constructing a
scheme for taxing REIT shareholders on income derived from property in the taxing state. For example, whether a low tax rate on
REIT shareholders would stimulate the inflow of capital investment
will generally depend on the factors surveyed above.160 Thus, again,
a generalized solution is not possible.
interests represented by transferable certificates, for small investors who could not
otherwise obtain the diversification of assets or expert management for their capital
that these entities offer. See H.R. REP. No. 2020, supra note 25, at ll-4.
159. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
160. The tax rate on REIT shareholders will likely have the same effect on a REIT
trustee's investment decisions as the tax rate on REIT income since the goal of the
REIT is to maximize its shareholders' income.
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CONCLUSION

It is apparent that in the twelve years since the passage of the
Real Estate Investment Trust Act, little or nothing has been done
on the state level to clarify what tax, tort, and contract liabilities the
REIT, its trustees, and its shareholders might face. The law on business trusts still varies widely among the states. While in some states
the law on the liabilities of business trust trustees and shareholders is
favorable, in others there is no law on the subject or the law is uncertain. Still other states would treat REIT trustees and shareholders unfavorably by subjecting them to liabilities that would not be
imposed on the officers and shareholders of a corporation. These
variations in state law on business trusts may create uncertainty for
potential investors and thus hinder investment in REITs.
Therefore, it has been argued that in order to provide uniformity
in the law and to treat like entities alike, a state's law on REITs
should parallel its corporations law. To equalize treatment of corporate and REIT creditors, trustees should be liable for REIT debts
and torts, but only to the limit of the value of the REIT's assets.
With respect to state taxation of REITs and their shareholders, no
definite conclusion can be reached; each state, on the basis of numerous complex factors, must choose the plan that best fits its own needs
and desires.
Regardless of what plan is actually adopted, however, it is obvious that all states must clarify their laws on REITs. Until then a
potential investor or trustee cannot be certain of the liabilities he
may be undertaking.

